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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Victor Rene Arvizu appeals from the district court’s order revoking probation
and executing the sentence previously imposed upon Arvizu’s convictions for two
counts of battery on jail staff.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Arvizu pled guilty to two counts of battery on certain personnel (jailer), for
which the district court placed him on a five-year period of probation with an
underlying unified sentence of five years with the first year fixed. (R., pp.80-85.)
Subsequently, a report of probation violation was filed alleging Arvizu had violated
the terms of his probation by failing to obtain a mental health evaluation as directed
by his probation officer and by failing to take all prescribed medications. (R., pp.8788.)
Arvizu denied the violations and the matter went to evidentiary hearing where
the court found insufficient evidence to find Arvizu had violated the second condition
but concluded there was substantial evidence to find Arvizu had violated the first by
failing to obtain a mental health assessment as directed by his probation officer.
(4/3/15 Tr., p.40, L.15 – p.41, L.2.)
At the disposition hearing, the court determined that, in light of Arvizu’s
ongoing position that he did not “believe [he had] any mental-health condition that
need[ed] to be addressed,” it was unable to “conclude that [Arvizu did not] present a
risk to the community presently” and revoked his probation. (4/10/15 Tr., p.16-20.)
Arvizu timely appealed. (R., pp.169-175.)
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ISSUES
Arvizu states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in revoking Mr. Arvizu’s
probation?

2.

In revoking Mr. Arvizu’s probation, did the district court violate
Mr. Arvizu’s constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection?

(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Arvizu failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by
revoking his probation?

2.

Has Arvizu failed to show that the district court committed fundamental,
constitutional error when it revoked his probation?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Arvizu Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Revoking His Probation
A.

Introduction
Arvizu contends that the district court abused its discretion in revoking his

probation. (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-13.) Specifically, Arvizu contends that the district
court (1) failed to act consistently with applicable legal standards when it revoked his
probation for what Arvizu contends was a non-willful violation, and (2) otherwise
abused its discretion because, according to Arvizu, “the probation violation did not
warrant revocation.”

(Appellants brief, pp.5-13.)

Arvizu’s claims fail because a

review of the record reveals that the district court acted well within its discretion in
revoking Arvizu’s probation.
B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to revoke probation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State

v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392, 744 P.2d 116, 120 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. Drennen,
122 Idaho 1019, 1021, 842 P.2d 698, 700 (Ct. App. 1992). “When a trial court’s
discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multitiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue
as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific
choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason.” State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333
(1989).
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“[A] district court’s finding of a probation violation will be upheld on appeal if
there is substantial evidence in the record to support the finding.” State v. Sanchez,
149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009). An appellate court will accept the
district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous but “may freely
review the district court’s application of constitutional principles in light of the facts
found.” Id. at 104, 233 P.3d at 35 (citations omitted).
“The construction and application of legislative enactments and, by analogy,
court rules are questions of law over which [this Court] exercise[s] free review.”
Hansen v. State, 138 Idaho 865, 868, 71 P.3d 464, 467 (Ct. App. 2003).
C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion With Respect To The
Probation Violation Allegation That Arvizu Failed To Obtain A Mental Health
Evaluation At The Direction Of His Probation Officer
A trial court has discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and

conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v.
Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams,115
Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989). When deciding whether to
revoke probation, the district court must consider “whether the probation [was]
achieving the goal of rehabilitation and [was] consistent with the protection of
society.” Drennen, 122 Idaho 1019, 1022, 842 P.2d 698, 701.
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(f)1 provides, in relevant part:

1

Effective July 31, 2015, Idaho Criminal Rule 33(e) was renumbered as I.C.R. 33(f).
This amendment did not change the language of this subsection, which was
substantively amended in 2012. See 4/23/14 Order “In Re: Amendment of Idaho
Criminal Rule (I.C.R.) 33.”
4

The court shall not revoke probation unless there is an admission by the
defendant or a finding by the court, following a hearing, that the defendant
willfully violated a condition of probation.
Therefore, the plain language of I.C.R. 33(f) purports to divest a district court of its
authority to revoke a defendant’s probation unless the court finds that the defendant
willfully violated a condition of his probation. Prior to the 2012 amendment to this
rule which added this requirement, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that where a
defendant’s probation violations were not willful, a district court could still choose to
revoke probation, but only after first considering “whether adequate alternative
methods of punishing the defendant [were] available.” State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho
378, 381-383, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340-1342 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing Bearden v. Georgia,
461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983)).
In this case, the state’s report of probation violation alleged that Arvizu
violated his probation by failing to complete a mental health evaluation and failing to
stay on prescribed medications. (R., p.85.) On appeal, Arvizu contends that the
district court erred by failing to apply I.C.R. 33(f) with respect to the first allegation
pertaining to his failure to obtain a mental health evaluation. (Appellant’s brief, pp.610.)
Arvizu’s claim fails for two reasons. First, a review of the record reveals
substantial evidence that Arvizu’s failure to obtain a previously ordered mental health
evaluation was based upon Arvizu’s own willful conduct. Thus, this violation justified
the district court’s revocation of probation pursuant to I.C.R. 33(f). Additionally, even
if Arvizu’s probation violation was not willful, Arvizu is still not entitled to relief
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because the district court had authority under a number of statutes to revoke
Arvizu’s probation, regardless of whether the violation was willful.
1.

Arvizu’s Failure To Obtain A Mental Health Evaluation Constituted A
Willful Probation Violation

Even assuming that I.C.R. 33(f) divested the district court of its authority to
revoke Arvizu’s probation absent the finding of a willful violation, Arvizu cannot show
that the district court ultimately erred in revoking his probation because there is
substantial evidence in the record that Arvizu’s failure to obtain a mental health
evaluation was based upon willful conduct.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the district court concluded that
Arvizu violated his probation by “failing to complete a mental health assessment as
lawfully instructed by his probation officer.” (4/30/15 Tr., p.40, Ls.15-19.) Although
the court did not expressly find that the violation was willful, it did conclude that
Arvizu was directed by his probation officer to obtain a new mental health evaluation
and he did not.

(4/30/15 Tr., p.38, L.5 – p.40, L.19.)

Substantial evidence in the

record indicates that this violation was willful. At the evidentiary hearing, Arvizu’s
probation officer testified that Arvizu repeatedly told the probation officer that he did
not believe he had any mental health concerns and in fact believed that there was
“nothing wrong with him.” (4/3/2015 Tr., p.13, Ls.3-13, p.16, Ls.13-15.) Arvizu’s
probation officer testified at the evidentiary hearing that Arvizu did not obtain a
mental health evaluation:
Q. (by the state) And at some point, did you request that he go
get a mental health assessment?
A. (P.O. Justin Volle) Yes, I did. Specifically on May 22, 2014, I
instructed him to go to the VA, obtain a mental health assessment.
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This is following several other circumstances of his failure to obtain a
mental health evaluation.
Q. Okay. What other attempts did you make to have him get
this evaluation?
A. Well, there was several times that we discussed his mental
health. We had a sit-down meeting with a VA representative. His
name was Joshua Bodie. He is a professional at the VA helping with
VA liaison stuff in setting up mental health assessments.
His recommendation was that Mr. Arvizu obtain a new mental
evaluation other than the previous one that he completed when he was
– his first day at State Hospital South. So that’s where we went from
that.
On May 22, 2014, I instructed his to get a new mental health
assessment. This was the result of a disagreement between myself
and Mr. Arvizu about his mental condition.
He expressed concern to me that the report from State Hospital
South was not accurate, and he indeed did not need to take
medication.
In response to this, I agreed and instructed him to obtain a new
mental health assessment upon which that would be the medication
that I would instruct him to take.
Q. And did he go get this assessment?
A. He did not.
(4/3/15 Tr., p.12, L.8 – p.13, L.15.)

When Arvizu ultimately appeared for the

evaluation, he did not obtain one because of his desire not to complete it: “At the
time he said he went to the VA, but when they tried – for the evaluation, but when he
told them that I made him go, then they would not administer the evaluation.”
(4/3/15 Tr., p.21, Ls.2-5.)
Contrary to Arvizu’s argument on appeal that the failure to obtain a mental
health evaluation “was a condition beyond his control – he was not responsible or at

7

fault for being denied an evaluation” (Appellant’s brief, p.9), the court correctly
determined that Arvizu was responsible for the denial of an evaluation. The report of
probation violation is consistent with this conclusion,
On May 22, 2014, Mr. Arivizu [sic] was instructed, by his supervising
probation officer, to complete a mental health assessment. Mr. Arvizu
was provided information to obtain a free mental health assessment
through the Department of Veteran’s Affairs. Upon attending his
scheduled appointment with the Department of Veteran’s Affairs, he
stated that he told them “I don’t want to do this and my P.O. is making
me.” Because of these statements, the Department of Veteran’s Affairs
did not complete the mental health assessment.
(R., pp.87-88.) Arvizu reported to his probation officer that he had not completed an
assessment. (R., p.88.) His probation officer gave Arvizu another opportunity to
obtain the mental health assessment, but Arvizu declined to take advantage of this
opportunity – likely because he believed there was “nothing wrong with him.” (R.,
p.88.)
At the disposition hearing, the district court, without citing to I.C.R. 33(f) did
appear to address the willfulness question when discussing with Arvizu his failure to
obtain a new assessment as directed by his probation officer:
You were asked, you were instructed to get a mental-health
assessment from the VA and you – you blocked it effectively from
happening by going there and telling the VA that you were there
against your will, or you weren’t, you know, you were being told to do it.
You didn’t want to do it, and so it didn’t happen.
(4/10/15 Tr., p.16, Ls.9-15 (emphasis added).)
Thus, even assuming that I.C.R. 33(f) divested the district court of its authority
to revoke Arvizu’s probation absent the finding of a willful violation, Arvizu has failed
to show error because the record demonstrates that his violation was in fact, willful.
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2.

The Court Acted Consistently With Governing Legal Standards In
Revoking Arvizu’s Probation, Regardless of Whether The Violations
Were Willful

As discussed above, I.C.R. 33(f) purports to preclude a district court from
exercising its authority to revoke a defendant’s probation unless it finds that the
defendant willfully violated a condition of his probation. However, the authority of a
trial court to revoke probation is also governed by several statutes. Among them,
I.C. § 20-222(2) provides, in relevant part:
At any time during probation or suspension of sentence, the court
may issue a warrant for violating any of the conditions of probation or
suspension of sentence and cause the defendant to be arrested.
Thereupon the court, after summary hearing may revoke the probation
and suspension of sentence and cause the sentence imposed to be
executed, or may cause the defendant to be brought before it and may
continue or revoke the probation, or may impose any sentence which
originally might have been imposed at the time of conviction.
Pursuant to the plain language of this statute, a court may revoke a defendant’s
probation when the defendant has violated “any of the conditions of probation.” I.C.
§ 20-222 (emphasis added). The statute does not contain any requirement that the
violation be “willful.” Rather, the only limitation on the court’s authority to revoke
probation imposed by this statute is that there actually be a violation of one or more
conditions of probation.
Idaho Code §§ 19-2602 and 19-2603 similarly grant trial courts broad
authority to revoke probation. In fact, pursuant to those statutes, a court’s “authority
to revoke the probation does not even depend upon [a] violation of any of the terms
or conditions of the order.” Ex parte Medley, 73 Idaho 474, 482, 253 P.2d 794, 798
(1953), quoted in Franklin v. State, 87 Idaho 291, 297, 392 P.2d 552, 554 (1964).
Idaho Code § 19-2602 authorizes a district court to “issue a bench warrant for the
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rearrest of the defendant” where “it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that the
terms and conditions upon which the defendant was placed on probation by the
court…have been violated or for any other cause satisfactory to the court.” Further,
“[w]hen the court finds that the defendant has violated the terms and conditions of
probation,” Idaho Code § 19-2603 provides that the court “may, if judgment has been
withheld, pronounce any judgment which it could originally have pronounced, or, if
judgment was originally pronounced but suspended, revoke probation.”
Consistent with the plain language of I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-222,
Idaho’s appellate courts have recognized that the trial courts of this state have
statutory authority to revoke probation in two circumstances: “(1) [upon] satisfactory
proof of a violation of a probation condition, or (2) [for] ‘any other cause satisfactory
to court.’” State v. Kelsey, 115 Idaho 311, 314, 766 P.2d 781, 784 (1988) (citing I.C.
§§ 19-2602 and 20-222), quoted in State v. Buzo, 121 Idaho 324, 326, 824 P.2d 899,
900 (Ct. App. 1991); see also Franklin, 87 Idaho at 297, 392 P.2d at 554; Ex parte
Medley, 73 Idaho at 482, 253 P.2d at 798-99; State v. Hancock,111 Idaho 835, 727
P.2d 1263 (Ct. App. 1986). It is true that Idaho’s appellate courts have held that a
trial court must consider alternatives to imprisonment before revoking a defendant’s
probation based on a violation that is “not willful, or was beyond the probationer’s
control.” Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 106, 233 P.3d at 37. However, nothing in the
relevant statutes actually prevents a trial court from revoking probation where the
violation or other “cause satisfactory to the court” was not willful.
As discussed above, the plain language of I.C.R. 33(f) purports to divest a
district court of its authority to revoke a defendant’s probation unless it finds that the
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defendant willfully violated a condition of his probation. The requirement is of no
effect, however, because it directly conflicts with the broad authority to revoke
probation granted by I.C. §§ 19-2602, 9-2603 and 20-222, and because a court’s
authority to revoke probation is a matter of substantive, not procedural, law.
“When a statute and rule can be reasonably interpreted so that there is no
conflict between them, they should be so interpreted rather than interpreted in a way
that results in a conflict.” State v. Two Jinn, Inc., 148 Idaho 706, 709, 228 P.3d 387,
390 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 974, 188 P.3d 912, 916
(2008)). However, in this case, it simply is not possible to reasonably interpret I.C.R.
33(f) in a way that does not conflict with I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-222.
Pursuant to the rule, a trial court “shall not revoke probation unless...the defendant
willfully violated a condition of probation.” I.C.R. 33(f). The statutes, on the other
hand, give the court broad authority to revoke probation upon proof of a violation of
“any” of the probation conditions or “for any other cause satisfactory to the court.”
I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603, 20-222.
Because it is not possible to reconcile the rule and the statutes, “this Court
must determine whether the conflict is one of procedure or one of substance.”
Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916; see also State v. Currington, 108 Idaho
539, 540-41, 700 P.2d 942, 943-44 (1985); Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709, 228 P.3d at
391. “Substantive law issues are the province of the legislature, while matters of
rulemaking and procedure are generally the province of the judiciary.” Two Jinn, 148
Idaho at 709, 228 P.3d at 390 (citing Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916;
State v. Yoder, 96 Idaho 651, 654, 534 P.2d 771, 774 (1975)). Thus, if the conflict
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between a statute and a criminal rule relates to matters of procedure, the criminal
rule will prevail. Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916 (citing State v. Beam,
121 Idaho 862, 863, 828 P.2d 891, 892 (1992)); Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709, 228
P.3d at 390. “Conversely, in matters of substantive law, the statute applies.” Two
Jinn, 148 Idaho at 709-10, 228 P.3d at 390-91 (citing Beam, 121 Idaho at 864, 828
P.2d at 893).
In determining whether a conflict relates to matters of substantive law or,
instead, to matters of procedure, the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted the
following general guidelines:
Substantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct and
punishments for violations thereof. It thus creates, defines,
and regulates primary rights. In contrast, practice and
procedure pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of
the courts by which substantive law, rights, and remedies are
effectuated.
Currington, 108 Idaho at 541, 700 P.2d at 944 (quoting State v. Smith, 527 P.2d 674,
676-77 (Wash. 1974)); accord Beam, 121 Idaho at 863-64, 828 P.2d at 892-93;
Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916; Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 710, 228 P.3d at
391.
Applying these guidelines in Johnson, the Idaho Supreme Court determined
that any conflict between I.C.R. 7(b) – which requires a charging document to allege
the “essential facts constituting the offense charged” – and I.C. § 19-1430 – which
abolished the distinction between accessories and principals such that “no other
facts need be alleged in any indictment against such an accessory than are required
in an indictment against his principal” – was a matter of substantive law. Johnson,
145 Idaho at 974-75, 188 P.3d at 916-17. Specifically, the Court explained:
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The Legislature’s definition of principal and abolishment of the
distinction between principal and accessories does not pertain
to mechanical operations of the courts; the Legislature is
creating, defining, and regulating primary rights. Thus, I.C. §
19-1430 is substantive and does not overlap with this Court’s
power to create procedural rules. Therefore, even if I.C. § 191430 and I.C.R. 7(b) were in conflict, the statute would prevail.
Johnson,145 Idaho at 974-75, 188 P.3d at 916-17.
Similarly, in Beam, the Court held that a statute requiring a defendant in a
death penalty case to file a challenge to his or sentence within 42 days prevailed
over I.C.R. 35, which permits a challenge to an illegal sentence at any time. Beam,
121 Idaho at 864, 828 P.2d at 893. The Court reasoned that, given the unique
nature of the death penalty, the statute “creates, defines, and regulates a primary
right” and, as such, was a matter of substantive law. Id.
Like the statutes at issue in Johnson and Beam, the statutes granting trial
courts authority to revoke probation upon proof of a violation of any of the conditions
of probation or “for any other cause satisfactory to the court” are substantive in
nature. It is well settled that probation, itself, “is not a matter of right; it may be
granted the defendant through exercise of sound discretion by the trial court within
the ambit of authority conferred by the legislature.” Franklin, 87 Idaho at 297, 392
P.2d at 554. Because a trial court’s power to place a defendant on probation only
exists as a function of the legislature’s power to enact substantive law, it follows that
a court’s authority to revoke probation is likewise a matter exclusively within the
province of the legislature. See id. at 300-301, 392 P.2d at 557 (citations omitted)
(“The legislatures of the several states have the exclusive and inherent power to
define, prohibit and punish any act as a crime within the limits of the federal and
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respective state constitutions.”). Indeed, a review of Idaho Code §§ 19-2602, 192603 and 20-222 shows they do not merely prescribe the mechanical procedure a
court must follow in revoking probation. Instead, they actually define and regulate
the circumstances under which a legislatively authorized grant of probation may be
revoked.
Because the authority of a court to revoke probation is a matter of substantive
law, the statutes granting the trial courts of this state that authority must “‘be given
due deference and respect,’” Johnson, 145 Idaho at 974, 188 P.3d at 916 (quoting In
re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 255, 912 P.2d 614, 623 (1995)).
Accordingly, to the extent I.C.R. 33(f) purports to divest trial courts of the authority
granted to them by the legislature to revoke probation upon proof of a violation of
any probation condition or for “any other cause satisfactory to the court,” the rule is
of no effect. In light of Arvizu’s violation of an express condition of his probation, the
district court had authority under I.C. §§ 19-2602, 19-2603 and 20-222 to revoke
Arvizu’s probation, regardless of whether the violation was willful.
D.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Declining To Reinstate
Arvizu On Probation
Arvizu contends that the district court erred because, he asserts, “failing to

obtain an evaluation did not warrant revocation of Mr. Arvizu’s probation when the
record was clear that Mr. Arvizu was otherwise compliant and doing well on
probation.” (Appellant’s brief, p.10.) Arvizu has failed to demonstrate that the district
court abused its discretion.
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Arvizu appears to argue that, because he was “doing exceptionally well on
probation,” did not have prior felony convictions, and “served in the military many
years ago,” the court was not justified in revoking his probation based upon a
“potential threat” to the community.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.11-13.)

Arvizu

oversimplifies the situation presented to the court.
Arvizu pled guilty to two counts of battery on jailers and had been recently
released from a commitment to a state mental health facility.

(R., pp.87-88.)

Because Arvizu was adamant that he had no mental health concerns, his probation
officer ordered him to obtain a current mental health assessment. (4/3/15 Tr., p.12,
L.8 – p.18, L.15.) Failing to obtain the assessment is potentially indicative of Arvizu’s
failure to follow conditions of his probation in the future. Additionally, it is clear from
the record that Arvizu does in fact have a history of mental health concerns.

(See,

R., pp.107-112.) These factors, bolstered by Arvizu’s rambling explanation to the
court about why there is absolutely nothing wrong with his mental health (4/10/15 Tr.,
p.5, L.25 – p.14, L.12), were sufficient to cause the court concern that Arvizu was a
potential threat to the community and not a suitable candidate for probation.
Arvizu has failed to demonstrate that the district court’s decision not to
reinstate him on probation constituted an abuse of discretion. This Court should
therefore affirm the district court’s order revoking probation and ordering the original
sentence executed.
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II.
Arvizu Has Failed To Demonstrate Fundamental Constitutional Error With Regard To
The District Court’s Sentencing Determination
A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal Arvizu contends the district court “violated [his]

rights to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and
Article I, Sections 2 and 13 because, had Mr. Arvizu not been diagnosed with a
mental health condition, he would have remained on probation.” (Appellant’s brief,
p.13.)

A review of the record reveals that Arvizu has failed to establish any

constitutional error, let alone clear and obvious fundamental error.
B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate courts of this state will only review unpreserved assertions of

error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245
P.3d 961, 978 (2010).
C.

The District Court Did Not Commit Fundamental Constitutional Error In Its
Sentencing Determination
Because Arvizu failed to raise a constitutional challenge to his sentence in the

district court, he must demonstrate fundamental error on appeal. Perry, 150 Idaho
at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. To do so, Arvizu must demonstrate: (1) a constitutional
violation; (2) that the violation is clear and obvious without the need for additional
information not contained in the appellate record; and (3) that prejudice resulted. Id.
Arvizu cannot make such a showing.
In State v. Todd, 147 Idaho 321, 208 P.3d 303 (Ct. App. 2009), the Idaho
Court of Appeals analyzed a due process and equal protection challenge to a district
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court’s discretionary sentencing determination. Specifically, the Court considered
whether the district court violated Todd’s constitutional rights by considering his
inability to pay restitution as a factor in imposing a prison sentence. Id. The Court
sought first to determine whether to analyze the claim as a due process or equal
protection challenge. Id. Quoting from Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983),
the Court of Appeals reasoned:
[W]e generally analyze the fairness of relations between the
criminal defendant and the State under the Due Process Clause, while
we approach the question of whether the State has invidiously denied
one class of defendants a substantial benefit available to another class
of defendants under the Equal Protection Clause.
…
A due process approach has the advantage in this context of
directly confronting the intertwined question of the role that a
defendant’s financial background can play in determining an
appropriate sentence. When the court is initially considering what
sentence to impose, a defendant’s level of financial resources is a
point on a spectrum rather than a classification. Since indigency in this
context is a relative term rather than a classification, fitting “the
problem of this case into an equal protection framework is a task too
Procrustean to be rationally accomplished,” North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711, 723, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2079, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 668 (1969).
The more appropriate question is whether consideration of a
defendant’s financial background in setting or resetting a sentence is
so arbitrary or unfair as to be a denial of due process.
Todd, 147 Idaho at 322-323, 208 P.3d at 304-305 (quoting Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665,
666 n.8). The Court of Appeals subsequently analyzed Todd’s challenge under the
due process clause. Id.
Similarly, in deciding to revoke probation in this case, the district court did not
create a classification; it instead analyzed the relationship between points on a
spectrum – the danger posed by Arvizu to the community against Arvizu’s refusal to
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obtain a mental health evaluation and his complete denial that he had any mental
health concerns despite his recent commitment to a state mental facility and his
concerning discourse with the court on the matter. (See generally, 4/3/15 Tr., p.5,
L.24 – p.14, L.12.) Therefore, Arvizu’s claim should be interpreted as raising a due
process challenge, i.e., whether the court’s consideration of the suitability of Arvizu
for probation in the context of Arvizu’s disabilities and the danger he posed to the
community was “so arbitrary or unfair as to be a denial of due process.”2

Arvizu

cannot show that the district court’s analysis of these factors constituted a due
process violation, let alone clear and obvious fundamental constitutional error.
The primary underlying purpose of probation is rehabilitation. See State v.
Wilson, 127 Idaho 506, 510, 903 P.2d 95, 99 (Ct. App. 1995). It is therefore prudent
and appropriate for a sentencing court to consider arguments and evidence
regarding whether or not a defendant might be successful on probation in light of
both the particular characteristics of the offender and the rehabilitation opportunities
available in the community.
In this case, the district court’s consideration of Arvizu’s suitability for
probation based on the evidence presented to it was entirely reasonable, and not
arbitrary or unfair. Having recognized that Arvizu was potentially a candidate for
continued probation – assuming a theoretical situation wherein he received an
updated mental health assessment and followed any recommended treatment plan –

The state also asserts that Arvizu failed to demonstrate fundamental error if his
claim is interpreted as raising an equal protection claim. For the same reasons as
discussed below, the district court’s drawing of “classifications” (between defendants
with mental health conditions and those without) in this case was rationally related to
the legitimate state interest of protecting the community.

2
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the court was not then constitutionally required to continue Arvizu on probation
where the existence and scope of his mental illness had not been determined or
addressed. It is not constitutionally arbitrary or unfair for a district court to utilize its
sentencing discretion in a manner that takes into account the realities and limitations
of community supervision options.
Arvizu has cited no case contrarily holding that such considerations violate
the due process clause. State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 606, 167 P.3d 357 (Ct. App.
2007), is instructive.

After Braaten completed his second period of retained

jurisdiction, the district court declined to place Braaten on probation, and instead
relinquished jurisdiction. Id. at 607-608, 167 P.3d at 357-358. The district court
explained that it was concerned about whether society would be adequately
protected if Braaten were on probation when, because of his indigence, he would not
be able to obtain proper housing and treatment. Id. at 607, 167 P.3d at 358.

In

other words, the district court based its sentencing determination on whether suitable
housing and treatment were available to Braaten.
On appeal, Braaten asserted that the district court violated his equal
protection and due process rights by considering his indigence in denying him
probation. Id. at 606, 167 P.3d at 357. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court’s sentencing determination. Id. at 607-610, 167 P.3d at 358-361. The Court
recognized that the state had a “strong and legitimate interest in protecting society
from criminals and, therefore, in disallowing probation for an offender if the offender
cannot be adequately supervised or if his conditional release will present an undue
risk to society.” Id. at 610, 167 P.3d at 361. The Court held that the means used to
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protect that interest – the denial of probation for Braaten due to his indigence – was
directly and rationally related to the interest, and therefore did not offend
constitutional due process or equal protection principles. Id.
Similarly, in the present case, the state’s strong and legitimate interest in
protecting society was furthered by the denial of probation based upon Arvizu’s
failure to follow his probation officer’s order to obtain an updated mental health
evaluation. Like Braaten, who was denied probation not because of his lack of
resources per se, but because of the effect of that lack of resources on the likelihood
that he could be adequately supervised, Arvizu was denied probation not because of
his mental disability per se, but because of the effect of his untreated mental health
issues and resulting likelihood that he could be adequately supervised and the
community protected if he were placed on probation.
Arvizu has failed to establish that the district court’s sentencing determination
constituted a violation of his constitutional due process rights, let alone clear and
obvious fundamental error. This Court should therefore affirm the district court’s
order revoking probation.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order
revoking probation and executing the sentence previously imposed upon Arvizu’s
convictions for two counts of battery on jail staff.
DATED this 29th day of January, 2016.
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NICOLE L. SCHAFER
Deputy Attorney General
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